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Technology permits us wonderful new opportunities, but it 
can also be misused just as creatively to threaten public 
safety and national security. The public is beginning to 
understand that information technology, like other human 
creations is not an unqualified good. . . . I consider high-
tech crime to be one of the most serious issues that I face 
in the Department and one of those that demands much of 
my attention. 
Janet Renol 
INTRODUcrrON 
[Vol. 50 
In the year 2003, Lucky Marciano, head of the Marcianocrime 
organization, sits at home in front of his personal computer. Lucky is 
laun~ering millions of illegally earned profits through the Internet with 
electronic cash.2 Several months earlier, police raided the house of Joey 
Golliti, who runs Lucky's drug operations. They found two kilos of 
cocaine and $5 million of electronic cash stored on Joey's computer.3 
In 2004, Lucky's money laundering operation takes another hit. 
Police arrest six of Lucky's people for trafficking and discover several 
hundred large denomination "smart cards" in their luggage.4 These are 
forfeited. On the other hand, Lucky has been successful laundering 
money via cellular telephones. Lucky calls his accomplices in Europe 
and swipes his smart card across the cell phone, instantly sending elec-
tronic cash to Europe.s 
In 2005, Lucky's drug sales via electronic cash increase 250% 
because welfare recipients start using their government-issued smart 
cards to buy drugs. 
With advances in electronic commerce, this hypothetical could be 
reality soon. This Article discusses the potential use of electronic cash 
1. Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, Law Enforcement in Cyberspace, an Ad-
dress presented to the Commonwealth Club of California (June 14, 1996) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Reno Address]. 
2. For some of the ideas and hypotheticals in this Article, the authors thank RAND 
Corporation and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an office in the Treasury 
Department, for inviting us to participate in their simulation and operational exercises in 
Washington, D.C. We cite the conference as Cyberpayment Systems Exercise (Apr. 17, 1997), 
which refers to the discussions and infonnational sessions that we attended. We also cite the 
conference workbook as Cyberpayment Systems Exercise Workbook. The workbook is on file 
with the authors. 
3. See Cyberpayment Systems Exercise Workbook, supra note 2, at E-3. 
4. See id. 
5. See id.; Cyberpayment Systems Exercise, supra note 2 (discussing cell-phone tech-
nology and the phones' interoperability with electronic payment systems). 
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for money laundering and possible government responses to the 
problem. Parts I and II provide an overview of electronic cash. Part III 
explores the effects that electronic cash can have on money laundering. 
Part N explains through a series of hypotheticals how "cyberlaunder-
ing" can occur. Part V analyzes the federal government's response to the 
threat of money laundering with electronic cash. Part VI concludes the 
Article with suggestions. 
I. OVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC CASH 
In the late 1960s, the United States Department of Defense formed 
what we now call the Internet. 6 The Internet is an infrastructure com-
posed of thousands of computer networks linked together through 
common routers? An estimated forty million people are linked to the 
Internet worldwide, and that number is growing rapidly.8 With a 
connection to the Internet, people can buy and sell goods and services. 
Projections for electronic commerce on the Internet in the year 2000 
indicate it will be approximately $255 billion in the United States.9 The 
6. See Peter E. Dyson, The Seybold Report on Desktop Publishing, Apr. 4, 1994, 
available in 1994 WL 13596797. 
7. See id.; see also Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 
Exploring the World of Cyberpayments: An Introductory Survey app. I (1995) [hereinafter Ex-
ploring the World of Cyberpayments] ("Security Section"). 
lows: 
Two sets of frequently seen initials on the Internet, WWW and html, developed as fol-
The World Wide Web (WWW), developed at CERN (the European nuclear 
research center), is a system of cross-linked hypertext databases that are distributed 
widely across the Net. Documents in the Web are prepared in the Hypertext 
Markup Language (html), which is an sgml-compliant document type that supports 
non-textual data. 
Dyson, supra note 6. 
8. See Ted Bridis, Internet Traffic Is Doublirzg Every 100 Days, LEXINGTON HERALD 
LEADER, April 16, 1998, at D2; Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. II, 
at 1. The Internet has more people than 49 American states and 7 of the European Union's 12 
members. See Net Profits, THE EcONOMIST, July 9, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12754212; 
International Body Addresses New Issues in LAundering, REPoRT ON SMART CARDS, Mar. 17, 
1997, available in 1997 WL 8987484 ("there are an estimated 12.8 million host locations and 
61.9 million users who generate more than a billion e-mail messages per month"). 
9. See Diane Francis, Banks Might Be the Casualties in Move to Electronic Money, FIN. 
POST, Feb. II, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4087183; Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, 
supra note 7, app. II, at 2 (noting that a conservative projection for Internet commerce is $10 
billion). 
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commercial opportunities are causing new retail payment systems to de-
velop. 10
One new form of retail payment system is electronic cash.11
Electronic cash is a claim on a party, usually the issuer, stored as a
computer code on a plastic card or on the hard drive of a personal
computer. 12 Electronic cash is basically a little speck of value in
digital form that a computer can read. Just as traditional currency is not
value itself but merely represents value, so the digital speck represents
value. 13 Electronic cash is issued and sold by private companies. The
electronic cash can be sent over open information systems like the
Internet 14 or encoded on a plastic card. Consumers use traditional
money to buy the electronic cash from the issuing company, and then
use it to buy goods and services from merchants who accept electronic
cash as payment.15 Electronic cash is also called e-cash, digital cash,
digital money, and cyberpayments. 16 Electronic cash can be used in
three ways: on stored value cards, on personal computers, and in hybrid
systems. 17
This description of electronic cash assumes that it is stored value, or
in other words, is in "tokenized" form. Electronic cash usually falls into
10. See Sarah J. Hughes, A Call for International Legal Standards for Emerging Retail
Electronic Payment Systems, 15 ANN. REV. BANK. L. 197, 207 (1996).
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY AND BANKING: THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 5 (Sept. 19, 1996) [hereinafter TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY]. See
generally Symposium, The Electronic Future of Cash, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 961-1335 (1997).
12. See TOWARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 5. Value can be stored in
personal computers and moved electronically from one computer to another with no face-to-face
interaction. See id. DigiCash and Cybercash are systems designed to facilitate electronic
commerce on the Internet. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 9.
13. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 5. One commentator stated that
"SVCs and e-cash are today merely symbols of paper currencies, which are themselves merely
symbols of value." "It Will Change the World," REPORT ON SMART CARDS, May 20, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 15841975.
14. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 3. For example, two companies
are developing a hybrid system that will allow electronic cash to be moved from a smart card
to the hard drive of a computer and vice-versa. See FATF SECRETARIATE, FATF-VIII MONEY
LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES EXERCISE PUBLIC REPORT, Feb. 5, 1997, at 15 [hereinafter FATF
REPORT].
15. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 14, at 5.
16. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 1.
17. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, at 15-16. Two variations of electronic cash have
emerged that descriptively are called "net-around money" and "walk-around money." "Net-
around money" involves personal computers and is used for on-line purchases. DigiCash's digital
coins are an example of "net around money." "Walk-around money" primarily is used in face-to-
face transactions. Mondex cards are an example of "walk-around money." See Hughes, supra
note 10, at 213.
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two basic categories, notational or tokenized.1 8 Notational systems are
account-based and use conventional financial institutions. 19 These
systems leave an audit trail and can be integrated into the current
payment infrastructure. 20 On the other hand, tokenized systems take
full advantage of the Internet and the advancements in technology. 21
Tokenized systems may work outside the traditional banking infrastruc-
ture.
22
To understand the revolutionary character of tokenized electronic
cash, it can be conceptualized as a second currency system. The little
digital symbol sent over the Internet or encoded on a plastic card and
transferred by swiping the card is not just a right to get money from a
bank or from a credit card company. Rather, the digital speck is value
itself. Like cash, whoever holds the digital speck holds the value, and
can redeem it in other forms from the company that issued it. It is as if
a $50 bill is sent through the Internet. Checks, credit cards and debit
cards are only payment systems, whereas electronic cash can fulfill both
roles of traditional cash-as a payment system and as a stored-value
system.23 Throughout this Article, the discussion of electronic cash
assumes it is in tokenized form.
Several conditions drive the move to electronic cash. One is
advances in communications technology 24 and decreases in costs.
Moreover, economies of scale make electronic money attractive.25 The
point of a payment system is to allow efficient use of money. Tradition-
al retail payment systems other than cash,26 checks, debit cards, and
credit cards,27  are all account based. They require an elaborate
18. See Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Internet Payment Systems and the Cybercash Approach,
452 PLLIPAT. 123, 125 (1996).
19. See id. at 138.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 125-26.
23. See Francis, supra note 9.
24. See OFFICE Op TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFORMATION TECHNOLO-
GIES FOR THE CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 130 (1995) [hereinafter INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES]; Benjamin Wittes, The Dark Side of Digital Cash, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 30, 1995,
at 1 (consumers now can make purchases over the Internet with digital cash); see also Hughes,
supra note 10, at 206 (noting that both bank and nonbank service providers have developed new
payment options, including the nonbank service providers, First Virtual Holdings, Inc. and
DigiCash BV).
25. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 8.
26. See id. Debit cards and credit cards account for less than 10% of all retail transactions,
whereas cash is used in almost 80% of all retail transactions. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY,
supra note 11, at 30-31.
27. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 5. See also TOWARD
ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 30-31 (debit cards are the biggest form of electronic
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superstructure to support them. This is expensive. They are also slow
because they require a bank or credit card company to clear every
transaction. "8 Account based systems can be inefficient when used
with high volume, low value goods.29 Businesses are looking for more
efficient retail payment systems to take advantage of the Internet's
ability to handle such high volume, low value goods.
30
Electronic cash could fill that niche, revolutionize the consumer
market and eventually make traditional cash obsolete.31 Companies
like Visa and Microsoft are develoling electronic cash systems that will
give consumers adequate security 2 and will allow financial transac-
money whereas credit cards are the most popular payment form); E-Money Laundering Gets
State Department Attention, REPORT ON SMART CARDS, Mar. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8987476 (noting that already in design or use are cyberchecks, cybercredit, and cyberdebit with
the common feature being convenient and potentially anonymous transfers); see generally Cath-
erine Trevison, 3 Plead Guilty to Laundering Escort Money, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 18, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 10091991 (involving a case where pimps were accepting credit card
payments for their prostitutes' services and calling the credit card companies to verify their
clients' credit).
28. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with
Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & CoM. 395, 456 (1996). Debit
cards, however, do leave an audit trail for law enforcement. See id. at 457.
29. See id.
30. One example of the Intemet's use of high-volume, low-value goods is the "micro-
payment" concept. See Cybercash Bundling Mondex in Wallet, REPORT ON SMART CARDS, Oct.
7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15842147. With "micropayments," an information provider could
be paid a small amount anytime someone "clicked" on his piece of data. This would give
information providers some royalties for their work product. See Jared Sandberg, Cybercash
Lowers Barriers to Small Transactions at Internet, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1996, available in
1996 WL-WSJ 1180036 (describing a developing "microtransaction" system). However, credit
and debit cards could never work in a micropayment system due to the length of time it would
take to clear every transaction. See id.; see also Analysts' New Study Predicts Explosion in Use
of E-Money, REPORT ON SMART CARDS, Feb. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8987424 (noting
that consumers will not use their credit cards for purchases less than ten dollars).
31. See Wittes, supra note 24; A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third
Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv. 49, 114 (1996) (the dollar value of electronic
commerce could grow rapidly). Another view, however, is that the complete displacement of
cash is not likely because around 18 billion currency notes valued at $400 billion are in
circulation all over the world. See TOWARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 17 (one of
the most important issues facing people who are substantially affected by financial services is
the development of electronic money and electronic payment systems for retail transactions).
Around 270 billion dollars of U.S. currency is in circulation outside of the United States. But
see Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 6 n.2 (only one-third of all U.S.
currency in circulation is domestically held, and thus, it is unlikely that traditional cash would
become obsolete in the near future). In some less technologically advanced countries, U.S.
currency is the principal form of payment. See id. In those places, electronic money is many
years away. See id.
32. See Wittes, supra note 24. The following is an interesting account of what can happen
with inadequate security. See David Gow & Richard Norton-Taylor, Surfing Superhighwaymen
Banks Have Good Reason to Fear Thieves Who Hack into Their Secret Files, THE GUARDIAN
[Vol. 50
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tions on the Internet.33 If acceptance of electronic money is analogous
to the acceptance of automated teller machines and credit cards, growth
will be confined to a small base of users for the first five years and then
will expand tremendously.34
Electronic cash can be used three ways.
(City Page), Dec. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13391656.
One day Roberto Barbosa, director of an Argentinean firm, Invest Capital, stared with
dismay and shock at his computer screen after noticing that $200,000 had vanished from his
company's account with Citibank. Barbosa stated that, "[w]e were very, very surprised when we
opened the cash management account. There were four wire transfers made out of that account
without our authorization and anonymously sent to four unknown destinations." Id. Shortly after
the discovery, Barbosa contacted Citibank executives on Wall Street in New York City.
However, Citibank had more problems than just Barbosa's account because almost 20 of
Citibank's accounts, worth around $10 million, were being robbed. The top executives of
Citibank gathered on Wall Street to watch helplessly as their clients' funds rapidly were being
transferred to accounts in "California, Latin America, Finland, Israel, and the Netherlands."
Citibank had become the world's worst victim of "cyberspace" theft.
Citibank, in conjunction with the FBI, obtained evidence that led them to believe that the
mastermind behind the thefts was Vladimir Levin. Levin, who is 29 years old, is a computer
programmer from St. Petersburg, Russia, and is accused of carrying out the multi-million dollar
theft on a laptop computer at the St. Petersburg offices of AO Saturn.
What chain of events led Levin, a struggling computer programmer in Russia, to break into
the world's fifth largest bank and become the first person ever to penetrate the supposedly
unbreakable electronic payment systems that transfer trillions of dollars each day all over the
globe? One explanation is that about a year before Levin's theft, a computer and mathematical
genius who goes by the name Megazoid, broke into Citibank's files using only a "computer and
modem he bought for $10 and a bottle of vodka." One of Megazoid's accomplices in the crime,
a brilliant computer hacker who often was depressed, got drunk and sold the complex and
detailed secrets of how to "break into Citibank for $100 and two bottles of vodka." The buyers
are thought to be associated with the Russian mafia and used AO Saturn and Levin to carry out
their scheme. See id.
For related articles, see Joseph L. McCarthy, Cyberswindle!, CHIEF EXECUTIVE (U.S.), May
1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9565177; Citicorp Suffers First "Cyberheist" as Regulators Show
Concern, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Oct. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8353546; Computer
Hacker Pleads Guilty to Fraud in Citicorp Theft Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, available in
1996 WL-WSJ 3085681.
In addition to Levin and his accomplices, some London banks paid a multi-million dollar
ransom to criminal hackers who pierced their computer security systems and threatened to
launch "logic bombs," which paralyze the system, into the banks' computer systems. See Graeme
Browning, Cybercops and Robbers, NAT'L J., Mar. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7228268.
33. See Wittes, supra note 24; Analysts' New Study Predicts Explosion in Use of E-Money,
supra note 30 (Visa International, MasterCard International, and American Express are incorpo-
rating smart card technology into their existing systems). See also So Much for the Cashless
Society, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12754268 (describing the recent
growth and interest in developing money for Internet users).
34. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11; Francis, supra note 9 (stating that
in year 2000 electronic commerce will approach $255 million and that 30% of bank profits will
come from personal banking done on the Internet).
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A. Stored Value Cards
Stored value cards (SVCs) are the physical cards that contain the
electronic cash.35 SVCs are also called prepaid cards and value-added
cards. 36 The familiar credit cards and debit cards have magnetic strips
that store information. SV's, in contrast, can store value and process
information. 37 Technologically, the most feasible structure for SVC's
is to have a computer microchip embedded on the card.3 8 So equipped,
SVC's are called smart cards. 9 Microchip-based electronic cash is
expanding, and in the future, smart cards will likely play a big role in
domestic and worldwide markets as well as payment systems.U Stored
35. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 5.
36. See Gregory E. Maggs, New Payment Devices and General Principles of Payment
Law, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 753, 756 (1997). Copy cards are an example of stored value
cards.
Patrons may use the card to make photocopies. For every copy made, a card reader
reduces the code on the card by the cost of making a copy (typically about ten
cents). Patrons may increase the value of the card by inserting the card and
additional cash into a machine.
Id. at 756-57.
37. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 5; Maggs, supra note 36, at 756
("[tihese cards use a magnetic strip or a microchip to hold an encoded number representing a
sum of money").
38. Stored value cards can use either magnetic, optical, or chip technology. See FATF
REPORT, supra note 14, at 21. However, due to limited security, magnetic and optical cards are
not feasible alternatives for electronic money. See id. On the other hand, the microchip provides
security and is portable, and thus, a much better substitute for physical currency. See id. (noting
that magnetic strip cards are more susceptible to fraud than "smart cards" using microchips).
One of the most revolutionary aspects of smart cards is their multifunction capability. See
"It Will Change the World," supra note 13. Like most of the world's information, money is
starting to become electronic and digital; therefore, information may be placed and stored on the
cash itself. Id. When electronic money is programmed for specific uses and purchases, it is
called "paramoney." Dr. Alvin Toffler gives the following examples to illustrate paramoney:
A parent can give a child a smart card that can be used to purchase lunch-but not
dessert or cigarettes. If the child tries to purchase the latter, the transaction is
blocked by technology embedded in the card's chip. Similarly, the government can
issue a card to the poor to authorize purchases of milk and bread, but block
purchases of alcohol or candy.
Id. The government would likely find paramoney useful because the government could give
welfare recipients a smart card which limits purchases to certain items.
39. We use the terms interchangeably.
40. See E-Money Laundering Gets State Department Attention, supra note 27. See also
Going for Olympic Gold Cards, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8671578
(banks all over the world are starting to use smart cards).
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value cards are versatile because they "can take many forms, from
disposable, anonymous, single-use phone cards, to multi-function,
reloadable cards with systems that can track unspent values for every
card."41  Stored value cards can be described as part of a closed
system or an open one.42
1. Closed System
A system that has only a few merchants or that has many merchants
in a small geographic area is considered a closed system.43 One
variation of the closed system, the merchant-issuer model, exists where
the card issuer and the merchant are the same.44 Examples of the
merchant-issuer model are the subway system in Washington, D.C. and
university or campus cards that allow students to purchase goods and
services from the university.
45
The Washington, D.C. subway is a good example of how electronic
cash works in a closed environment. If a consumer wants to ride the
subway, she puts some traditional money in a metro machine. The
machine then will give her back a card with the equivalent dollar value
for use on the subway. At this point, the consumer has purchased a
claim on the city and has received electronic cash in return.46 This is
the merchant-issuer model because the city is both the issuer of the
metro card and the merchant. Once the consumer has the card, she can
use the subway.47 Every time she uses the subway a point-of-sale
machine records the transaction and reduces the value of the electronic
cash recorded on the metro card.4 8 The Washington, D.C. metro
system is linked to the traditional payment system by the city's
relationship with its bank.49 Periodically, the city clears out its
machines by taking all the cash that has been exchanged for electronic
money and putting it in the bank.
41. Waiting for a Smart World, SMART CARD BULL., Feb. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL
14481050.
42. See TOWARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 5-8 (the most effective way to
distinguish among electronic payment systems is to concentrate on the issuing entity and whether
the systems operate in an open or closed environment).
43. See id, at 5-6.
44. See id. at 6.
45. See i; see also Maggs, supra note 36, at 757 (the Washington, D.C. metro and the
San Francisco subway are users of SVCs).
46. See TOWARD ELECTRONIc MONEY, supra note 11, at 6.
47. See id.; see also Maggs, supra note 36, at 757 (stating that SVCs are more convenient
for consumers than having to carry around a pocketful of coins).
48. See TOWARD ELE-CRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 6.
49. See id.
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2. Open System
On the other hand, a system where consumers can use their smart
cards at many businesses over a wide geographical area would is an
open system. 0 Open system SVCs exist in Europe, the Far East, and
the United States. 51 The basic framework for an open system starts
with a consumer exchanging traditional money for electronic cash at an
issuing company.52 The consumer then takes the electronic cash and
exchanges it for goods and services at a participating merchant. The
merchant takes the electronic cash and exchanges it for traditional
money at the merchant's bank. The merchant's bank sends the electronic
money to a clearinghouse, which deals with interbank fund transfers,
and receives an interbank balance. The clearinghouse then sends the
electronic cash to the issuing bank and receives back an interbank
balance.53
An example of how an open system might work is the following:54
Consumer goes to Bank First and exchanges $1000 of traditional cash
for $1000 of Bank First's electronic cash on a smart card. Consumer
then goes to Wal-Mart 55 and purchases $500 of groceries, paying for
them with the smart card. At the end of the day, Wal-Mart accesses its
account at Bank Second via a computer and electronically sends
Consumer's electronic cash into its account. Bank Second credits Wal-
Mart's account and sends the electronic cash to Big Clearinghouse and
receives an interbank balance.
Ultimately, all smart card systems can be characterized as closed
systems because they all depend on some set of merchants agreeing to
accept the electronic cash as value. The distinction between open and
closed systems is not sharp, but it is a distinction being made,56 and
it is helpful in describing the systems.
50. See id. at 8. An open system includes many businesses over a large geographic area,
and so is more attractive to money launderers than a closed system because the laundering is
harder for law enforcement to detect. See id. Using the subway example, the electronic cash only
could be used to ride the subway in Washington, D.C., and thus, its laundering potential is very
limited.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 9.
53. See iL
54. See id.
55. Assume Wal-Mart is a participating merchant.
56. See TOWARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 5-8 (most effective way to distin-
guish among electronic payment systems is to concentrate on the issuing entity and whether the
systems operate in an open or closed environment).
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B. Personal Computers
Electronic cash can be put on the hard drive of a personal computer
as well as on a SVC. Consumers can use the digital money to purchase
items over the Internet.57 These network-based systems give the user
global access.58 DigiCash is an example of a network-based sys-
tem.59 Consumers using DigiCash must establish an account at a
bank.60 The consumers then download the money from their bank
accounts to an electronic wallet in their computer. 1 Consumers can
then purchase products over the Internet using their electronic cash.62
Internet merchants can exchange the electronic cash for value at
traditional banks.
63
C. Hybrid Systems
When SVCs and network-based computer systems work together,
they are called hybrid systems.64 Stored value cards and network-
based systems are becoming more compatible with each other,65 or
interoperable. 66 Developers of electronic cash are building smart card
interfaces for personal computers that will allow value to be moved back
and forth between smart cards and personal computers in seconds.67
This interrelationship makes it difficult to put them in distinct catego-
ries.68
Experts in electronic payment systems are projecting that all
computers will have built-in chip-card interfaces. 9 In other words,
computers will have a smart card reader built in. Consumers then can
57. See id. at 12.
58. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, app., at 30.
59. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 24, at 130-32.
60. See Hughes, supra note 10, at 210.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 210-11.
63. See id. at 211. Banks would have to recognize or have an agreement with DigiCash
before they could accept DigiCash's coins.
64. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, at 15.
65. See id.
66. See TOWARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 21-22 (explaining the need for
"interoperable" systems).
67. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. Chip-card interfaces are devices that function
as miniature ATM machines and are built-in to the consumers' personal computers.
68. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 8-10 (analyzing the
differences and similarities between systems). It should be emphasized that "[tihe possible points
of contact between PC-based electronic cash and the traditional payment system are functionally
identical to those between SVCs and the payment system." TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY,
supra note 11, at 12-13.
69. See Cyberpayment Systems Exercise, supra note 2.
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do their banking at home by having electronic money sent from the
bank's main computer to the consumers' personal computer hard drives.
On receiving the electronic cash from the bank, the consumer can
purchase items directly from the Internet or swipe a smart card across
the computer interface, downloading the electronic money from the hard
drive to the smart card. Then, the consumer could take the smart card
to the grocery and buy bread and coffee.
II. A BRIEF LOOK AT ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEMS WORLDWIDE
Electronic payment systems are growing worldwide. In Great Britain,
the Mondex system is popular.70 Mondex is a smart card system that
allows consumers to transfer electronic cash to their Mondex cards from
their bank accounts using a Mondex-compatible phone or an ATM.71
The Mondex card holds up to five different currencies per card,72 and
the consumer and merchant do not need signatures or authorizations to
complete a transaction.73 A security code prevents the electronic cash
stored on the computer chip from being misused.74 Consumers can
make a payment by inserting their Mondex cards into a merchant's
Mondex terminal or into another individual's electronic purse.
75
Therefore, electronic cash users can transfer value among themselves
without any intermediaries, i.e., without the issuer or any other financial
institution being involved in the transaction. These value transfers
directly between users, without any financial institution or electronic
cash issuer as intermediary, are called peer-to-peer transfers.76 Users
can trace their previous ten transactions, but the Mondex system does
not track all transactions.77 A typical transaction report from the
70. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 468. The Mondex system is a product of a joint ven-
ture between NatWest and Midland Bank. See a MasterCard International, Inc. recently has
acquired Mondex. See Mondex Becomes MasterCard Subsidiary, REPORT ON SMART CARDS,
Mar. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8987462. Mondex will become a subsidiary of MasterCard
and will have access to MasterCard's vast resources and distribution networks but will keep its
board of directors and London headquarters. See id.
71. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. I, at 1-2. Mondex and
CyberCash have worked out an alliance where consumers now can use Mondex's smart cards
to purchase goods on-line via CyberCash's wallet. See CyberCash Bundling Mondex in Wallet,
supra note 30.
72. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. III, at 2.
73. See id. at 1.
74. See id. at 2.
75. See id.
76. See Froomldn, supra note 28, at 468 (no bank intervention is necessary in peer-to-peer
transactions).
77. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. I, at 2. The Mondex
system has a risk management system in place that can detect potential misuse. For instance, the
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Mondex system provides the amount of the transaction and whether the
transaction was person to person or person to merchant.78 The report
does not reveal the identity of the person or merchant involved in the
transaction. 7
9
An interesting aspect of the Mondex system is that it can actually
increase the money supply.80 For instance, if Consumer places $100
in her checking account, the bank can use Consumer's money. Consum-
er has a claim on the bank for $100, but Consumer does not have use
of the money until she purchases something and it clears the bank.
However, under the Mondex system, if Consumer gives Mondex $100
in traditional money, Mondex will give Consumer a smart card that will
have $100 of electronic cash on it. Consumer has access to $100 of
electronic cash, and Mondex has access to $100 of traditional cash. If
Consumer buys something with her Mondex card, the merchant might
not redeem Consumer's electronic money from Mondex. Instead, the
merchant might use Consumer's electronic money in another electronic
transaction. Thus the money supply increases until Mondex redeems the
electronic cash.81 The difference between Mondex and other payment
options, such as checking accounts and travelers' checks, is that Mondex
urges its users to refrain from redeeming their cards.82
The Mondex system is expanding to several Asian countries.83
Likewise, Royal Bank of Canada and Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, Canada's two largest banks, have joined forces with Mondex
to start a smart-card system.54
France is the single largest European user of smart cards, with more
than twenty million in circulation. 85 In France and other parts of
Europe, they store medical records on smart health cards.
86
In Denmark, a company called Danmont has designed a smart card
system that is used with pay phones, newspapers, parking meters, public
Mondex system has certain threshold levels for typical use. When a person goes beyond the typi-
cal boundaries, the system will flag that person for further examination. See Growing Awareness
of Stored-Value Concept Prompts Security, Policy Concerns, REPORT ON SMART CARDS, July
29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15842064.
78. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. 1H, at 2 n.2.
79. See id.
80. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 470.
81. See id. at 470-71.
82. See id. at 470; see also So Much for the Cashless Society, supra note 33 (people
usually want cash to take a physical form and this might hurt electronic cash).
83. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. In, at 2.
84. See id. at 8.
85. See id. at 2.
86. See id. app. I (Smart Card Exhibit).
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transportation, vending machines, laundry, and cafeterias. 87 The system
is based on consumer convenience and is designed to replace coins and
to make high-volume, low-value transactions more efficient.88 The
Danmont system uses disposable chip-cards.
89
In Belgium, a manufacturer has developed a micro-processed smart
card called the Proton Smart Card.90 It can be used with telephones,
vending machines, parking meters, mass transit, taxis, cinemas, and
pharmacies. 9
1
Portugal is the first country to issue a global smart card that can be
perpetually reloaded. 92 It designed the smart card to be used with
ATMs.93 Holders of these smart cards can access up to twenty-six
services, from booking train tickets and paying utility bills to creating
investment portfolios and paying taxes.
9 4 -
South American electronic payment systems are expected to expand
very quickly. The infrastructure in Latin American countries will not
have to be overhauled for the new systems because checks, credit cards
and debit cards have not replaced cash there to the extent they have in
the U.S. 95  Visa International and MasterCard International are
preparing some smart card tests in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and
Colombia.96
In the United States, most smart cards are used in a few closed
systems. 97 However, businesses are spending billions of dollars
developing these systems.98 For instance, Wells Fargo Bank started a
Mondex system pilot program in San Francisco.99 The maximum limit
87. See id. app. Im, at 3.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Proton Roll-Out in Belgium, SMART CARD BULL., Mar. 1, 1995, available in 1995
WL 14481052; Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. III, at 3.
91. See Proton Roll-Out in Belgium, supra note 90; Exploring the World of
Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. Ill, at 3-4.
92. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. Inl, at 4.
93. See idl at 4-5.
94. See id. at 5. This is a good example of an open system.
95. See id. at 7.
96. See id.
97. See TOWARD ELECrRoNIc MONEY, supra note 11, at 6; cf. Exploring the World of
Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. I, at 7 (noting that in Japan and Germany almost 90% of
all banking transactions are performed on-line).
98. See TowARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11.
99. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. m, at 8; Mondex USA
Approved for Take-Off, REPORT ON SMART CARDS, Dec. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL
15842131 (noting that Wells Fargo will own 30%, Chase Manhattan Corp. 20%, AT&T Corp.
10%, MasterCard International, Inc. 10%, Dean Witter Discover 10%, First Chicago NBD 10%,
and Michigan National Bank 10%).
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on Mondex cards in the United States will be $1000.100
Citicorp is also developing an electronic cash system called the
Electronic Monetary System (EMS). 101 EMS works on a computer
network and will allow safe, instantaneous transactions. 10 2 EMS cards
are used with a consumer's personal computer by inserting the card into
a computer interface.10 3 One advantage over Mondex is that Citicorp
can track the cash it is issuing whereas Mondex cannot. 1° 4 Besides
Citibank, the owner of the East Coast's MAC automated teller network
is joining with some Delaware banks to launch a pilot program that will
place smart card chips in ATM cards.
10 5
Other examples of smart card use in the United States are VISA
International's experiment during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta
and the Jacksonville Jaguars stadium card. 106 Likewise, the New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority is moving towards smart card
technology for New York's subway system to increase efficiency and
lower costs. 10 7
Enigma Logic has developed a smart card called the DES Gold
Card.!ua This is a "supersmart" card "because unlike other micropro-
cessor-equipped smart cards, this one doesn't have to be attached to a
100. See Mondex USA Approved for Take-Off, supra note 99.
101. See Digitising Dollars, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8671580.
102. See id.
103. See id. This would be an example of a hybrid system.
104. See id.
105. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, app. Ill, at 7.
106. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 6, 14. Smart cards only have had
limited use in the United States. See id at 14. However, the Jacksonville Jaguar stadium card
came out in 1995. The following describes its application:
[O]ne bank issued cards that fans could use at the stadium to buy food, drink, and
souvenirs at football games. The transactions with these stored value cards work
much the same as with the merchant-issuer. The special POS [point of sale]
devices record the transaction for the merchant, altering the purchaser's stored
value card to reflect the decreased value. The merchant later presents the electronic
cash to the bank-issuer by downloading the payment information from the POS,
receiving traditional funds in exchange, typically in the form of a deposit balance
at the bank. The merchant's bank would then send the electronic cash through the
traditional payment system in much the same manner as presenting a check.
Id. at 6.
107. See Testimony Before Congress: The Future of Money, REPORT ON SMART CARDS,
Mar. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15842063.
108. See Citibank Tightens Security on External System Access, EFT REP., Jan. 17, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 7063523.
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card reader. It has its own key pad and window display for data
entry.' 09
III. "CYBERLAUNDIERING"
"Electronic money laundering will boom, traditional paths
are already highly supervised."
Dr. James Backhouse
110
Electronic cash shows promise as an efficient system for money
laundering.111 Using phony businesses to launder money may already
be unnecessary; 112 the current trend is to launder money through the
Internet.' 1 3 Using the Internet and stored value cards to turn illegally
obtained money into clean, untraceable funds is called
"cyberlaundering." 114 One government office working to squelch such
laundering is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), part
of the Treasury Department. FinCEN oversees and enforces laws
against money laundering, including the reporting laws of the Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA). FinCEN believes that the biggest potential money
laundering problems are the developments in technology and electronic
payment systems. 115 Kenneth Rijock, a convicted money launderer
and former banking attorney, stated that money launderers and drug
traffickers are becoming computer experts in response to advancements
in technology. 116 Laundering money through the Internet may already
109. Id
110. Dan Atidnson, Organized Crime Finds Hiding Place for Loot on Internet, THE
GUARDIAN (City Page), Apr. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4021421 (quoting Dr. James
Backhouse of the London School of Economics).
111. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 24, at 130-32; Wittes, supra note 24,
at 1 (discussing potential problems that law enforcement may have in detecting digital cash
schemes); Internet Aids Money Laundering Fraud Expert, REUTER Bus. REP., June 9, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (finding that the Internet has made it possible for
money laundering to become a worldwide $300 billion-a-year activity); FATF REPORT, supra
note 14, at 16 (it is generally agreed that hundreds of billions of dollars are laundered every
year).
112. See Conference to Examine Money Cyberlaundering, NEWSBYTES, Apr. 5, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 8906706.
113. See id.; see also Internet Aids Money Laundering Fraud Expert, supra note 111.
114. See Conference to Examine Money Cyberlaundering, supra note 112.
115. See Money Laundering Via Smart Cards, REPORT ON SMART CARDS, Mar. 17, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 8987475.
116. See Shannon Henry, Digital Cash: A Boon for the Mafia?, WASH. TECH., July 27,
1995, available in 1995 WL 9479159.
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be a reality for one U.S. company. The Global Financial Network has
been taunting the IRS and the FBI with claims of being able to "handle
cash derived from any activity," and the ability to conceal and hide
assets from the government and law enforcement. 117 However, it
appears that after Money Laundering Alert 118 started e-mailing the
company with questions regarding money laundering and federal law,
the company either dissolved or moved its cite.119
Electronic cash has advantages for money laundering. First there are
physical advantages. Electronic cash is not voluminous like regular
cash. On the contrary, vast amounts of electronic cash can be micro-
scopic. So electronic cash helps money launderers deal with the problem
of bulk.120  Electronic cash can be transferred to anywhere in the
world in seconds.121  It has lightning-quick transfer velocity,
allowing large amounts of value to be transferred quickly and securely
by just pressing a few keys on a computer keyboard. 122
Also, electronic cash is anonymous. 123 It may actually be more
anonymous than regular cash. With regular cash, there is usually, some-
where along the line, a face-to-face transfer, even if just between
underlings. This is not inevitable with electronic cash. Electronic cash
might be passed around the world with no two people ever seeing each
other. Moreover, anonymity can be increased because traditional cash
can be identified by serial numbers, but electronic cash may not be
117. See U.S. Company'Brazenly Offers Dubious Services on Internet, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, Sept. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8687316. The advertisement bragged that it could
assist in "concealing the source of your cash earnings, getting cash into the U.S. banking system,
getting cash into offshore accounts, and converting cash to other negotiable instruments." Id
118. Money Laundering Alert is a journal that focuses on modem trends in money launder-
ing.
119. See U.S. Company Brazenly Offers Dubious Services on Internet, supra note 117. We
tried unsuccessfully to find the brochure of the Global Financial Network. For any one who
would like to try and hunt down the Global Financial Network its website was
www.globalfinance.com.
120. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, app., at 7. Smart cards are easier to conceal than
cash. See id. Pamela Johnson, Assistant Director of FinCEN, noted that electronic cash is easier
to deal with than big sacks of cash. Johnson stated that, "[n]ow you have guns, drugs and
money. Soon you'll have guns, drugs, money, the Internet and smart cards." Henry, supra note
116; see also Sarah N. Welling; Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 292 (1989) (noting that large physical
amounts of currency often are generated through the drug trade).
121. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 16.
122. See id..
123. Electronic money on the Internet can be moved anonymously, which means that nei-
ther the initiator nor the recipient is identified. See Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Security Issues
in the World of Electronic Financial Affairs, in AALS Conference Pamphlet 486 (1996)
(discussion paper) (on file with author).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
individually identifiable. Anonymity is also enhanced because ille-
gitimate cyberbanks can hide their location through phantom electronic
forwarding addresses. 124 The phantom locations of some cyberbanks,
along with the ease of movement from one location to another, will
make it hard for the government to track money launderers.
125
Electronic cash also has legal advantages. Regular cash is, at least
initially, the payment system of choice for people with dirty money
because cash tells no tales-it cannot be traced. But cash is not a good
medium for holding booty in the long run because in large quantities it
is unwieldy. Also, in cash form, it provides no return. It must be
placed into the financial system to cure these problems. So, persons
with dirty money eventually seek to get it into the financial system.
Exploiting this need, the government has imposed reporting re-
quirements for large cash transactions.126 When cash is put into the
financial system or moved into or out of the U.S., financial institutions,
businesses and persons are under a series of reporting duties which
create a trail on the cash. Reporting requirements are imposed at a
series of information chokepoints. The reports make the cash traceable.
Electronic cash is not covered by the Bank Secrecy Act reporting
requirements now. But even if the BSA definitions were adjusted to
make the reporting requirements apply to electronic cash, it would not
be a complete solution. Electronic cash might not present as good an
information chokepoint as cash because persons holding electronic cash
have less need to insert it into the existing financial system. Assuming
electronic cash is widely accepted, the value can stay in electronic cash
form indefinitely. There is not the same incentive to get it into the
regular financial system because it does not have the unwieldy bulk of
124. See also Sarah J. Hughes, "Phantom" Cyberbanks Pose Laundering, Tax Evasion
Threat,, MoNEY LAUNDERING ALERT, July 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8353498 [hereinafter
Hughes, "Phantom" Cyberbanks].
125. See id. The process of money laundering is often described as having three phases:
placement, layering and integration. Electronic money facilitates each of these
phases. It will help with placement. Money launderers want to place their money
in legitimate sources like financial institutions and real estate where law enforce-
ment officials cannot easily trace the money. Second, cyberspace banking will help
launderers layer their transactions to make it harder to identify the beneficial
owner. Third, it will enhance integration because cyberbanks give money
launderers the ability to transfer huge sums of money with speed and anonymity
that was nonexistent in the past.
See id.
126. See generally 2 SARAH WELLING ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED
CIVIL ACTIONS §§ 18.1-18.5 (1998).
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cash. On the other hand, the other incentive for seeking entry into the
traditional system-the urge for a return-would still exist with electronic
cash. There are no investment opportunities (yet) outside the traditional
legal system. So electronic cash might provide an effective information
chokepoint, and BSA reporting requirements would be helpful in
creating a trail.
IV. CYBERLAUNDERING HYPOTHET[CALS
As mentioned in the previous section, financial institutions play a
crucial role in combating traditional money laundering because the
reporting laws rely on them as information chokepoints. The following
hypotheticals illustrate how electronic cash allows launderers to bypass
information chokepoints. 127 These hypotheticals flesh out the advan-
tages of electronic cash under the current system.
Assume Lucky Marciano, the crime kingpin, has accumulated
$1,000,000 in cash from illegal operations. Because only so much can
be absorbed through his lifestyle, Lucky has to launder the money.
One traditional approach would be to set up a legitimate, cash-
oriented business and commingle the legitimate cash with illegally
obtained cash. 128 This would give Lucky's illegal money a legitimate
cover when placed in the financial system. 129 The placement phase,
i.e., when cash is being entered iito the financial system, however, is
the stage where money launderers are most susceptible to being detected
because of the reporting requirements on financial institutions.130
With financial institutions under pressure to implement anti-money
laundering programs and report any suspicious activity,13 1 Lucky has
127. The director of FinCEN offered the following as a hypothetical:
A person could take his government-issued welfare card that would double as a
smart card, load money off of it to a drug dealer, and then the dealer could wire
the money to Colombia over the Internet, without ever touching a bank. As banks
are the primary way to track money-laundering, this trend effectively eliminates the
money trail that feds follow to find launderers.
Henry, supra note 116 (quoting Stanley Morris).
128. See Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to
Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 149 (1995).
129. See id.
130. See id, For a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the Bank Secrecy Act and bank
reporting requirements, see 2 WELLiNG, supra note 126, §§ 18.1-18.5 (1998); Matthew R. Hall,
Note, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering, and the
Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643 (1995-96).
131. See Hall, Note, supra note 130. One commentator suggests that more vague and
subjective standards will be released regarding the reporting of suspicious transactions along with
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a problem. If Lucky can avoid financial institutions, which have the
reporting requirements, and launder the money as electronic cash, then
his problem just got smaller.
Electronic cash allows Lucky to avoid financial institutions because
the companies issuing electronic cash are not currently defined as finan-
cial institutions. For instance, assume that Lucky has twenty minions
working for him. He sends all twenty of them to the local Mondex shop
where they each exchange $500 of traditional cash for Mondex's
electronic cash on a smart card. They take the smart cards, which total
$10,000, back to Lucky. He swipes the smart cards across his computer
interface, which transfers the electronic money from the smart cards to
Lucky's hard drive. Now, Lucky can get on the Internet and order goods
and services from anywhere in the world and pay for it with electronic
cash, or send his electronic cash anywhere in the world.
Assume that Lucky orders some furniture from Toni's Furniture and
pays in electronic cash. Toni's Furniture then can take the electronic
cash and either buy something with it on the Internet (which perpetuates
the avoidance of information chokepoints), or deposit the electronic
money into a bank that recognizes Mondex's electronic cash. The bank
would credit Toni's Furniture account with the money and decrease
Mondex's account.
Lucky has avoided financial institutions and so avoided the reporting
requirements. The only party taking traditional cash to a bank was
Mondex when it initially took the money received from Lucky's minions
to the bank for its daily deposit. Mondex was not required to make a re-
port about Lucky's suspicious minions because it is a not a financial
institution.132 Thus, the only customer that a bank could make a re-
port about is Mondex, not Lucky.
In addition, electronic cash helps Lucky with the import and export
of money. Suppose that Lucky has some illegal operations outside the
United States, and he deposits all of his illegal cash in European Union
Bank.133 At this point, Lucky could have all of his illegal money sent
stiffer penalties for bank noncompliance. The commentator makes the interesting point that a
$9500 cash transaction could be construed to be more suspicious than a $24,000 cash transac-
tion. See Douglas Barnes, Money Laundering and Regulation (visited Mar. 29, 1997)
<http://enfo.comMailLists/rre/0099.html>.
132. Only financial institutions are covered by the reporting requirements. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 5312.
133. European Union Bank (EUB) on the Caribbean island of Antigua boasts that it is "the
first offshore bank on the Internet." Antigua has extremely strict bank secrecy laws, and
Antiguan banks are not under any money laundering regulations. Furthermore, Antiguan banks
advertise that Antigua is not a party to any treaties that would allow for the transfer of financial
information to other countries. See Antigua Cyberbank Tests Laundering Curbs, MONEY
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to his computer's hard drive and move it anywhere. 13 4 Smart cards
help, too. If Lucky smuggled more than $10,000 cash across United
States borders, or structured around this amount, he would violate
reporting requirements and getting the money across the border would
have risks.' 5 Last year, the government confiscated $200 million in
cash from people illegally trying to enter or leave the country.136 On
the other hand, if Lucky took smart cards across the border, he would
be successful. 137  The Customs Service's money -sniffing canines
would be ineffective against plastic smart cards. 131 Smart cards also
would be less bulky to smuggle than currency. At any rate, because
smart cards are not currently defined as monetary instruments, Lucky
would not have to report the cards even if their value exceeded$ 10,000.139
The Internet also can facilitate money laundering by allowing Lucky
to set up a front company on the Internet. This company holds itself out
as a supplier of information services. The criminal uses the company as
LAUNDERING ALERT, June 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8687227. See generally European
Union Bank infonmation page (visited Apr. 2,1997) <http:llwww.eubankag/-eub/abouteub.htm>.
134. The Director of FinCEN has also posed a hypothetical:
Suppose my Internet user is a narcotics trafficker or an agent for any gang of
sophisticated criminals. Consider the invoices the trafficker might pay, the supplies
he might order and the transactions he might accomplish if, for instance, he could
download an unlimited amount of cash from a smart card to a computer, and then
transmit those funds to other smart cards in locations around the world-all
anonymously, all without an audit trail, all in a matter of seconds, and all without
the need to resort to a traditional financial institution.
FY97 Treasury, Postal Service Appropriations Before the Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service
& General Government, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Apr. 17, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 10162336 (statement of Stanley Morris, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network) [hereinafter Morris Statement].
135. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (illegal to import/export $10 thousand or more in any monetary
form); 2 WELLING ET AL., supra note 126, § 18.4 (1998) (§ 5316 only requires reports for
physical movements of money). Thus, computer transfers of currency would not be covered. See
id.
136. See Feds Hype Electronic Commerce at Meeting of Treasury Heavies, REPORT ON
SMART CARDS, Oct. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15842151.
137. See Browning, supra note 32 (quoting Robert E. Rubin, Treasury Secretary, "'[w]e are
concerned about the use of electronic transfer of value for cross-border money laundering or
cross-border tax evasion"').
138. See Feds Hype Electronic Commerce at Meeting of Treasury Heavies, supra note 136.
For an interesting discussion of canines, their detection capabilities, and currency, see Andy G.
Rickman, Note, Currency Contamination and Drug-Sniffing Canines: Should Any Evidentiary
Value Be Attached to a Dog's Alert on Cash?, 85 KY. LJ. 199 (1997).
139. See E-Money Laundering Gets State Department Attention, supra note 27.
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a clearinghouse for illegally obtained funds. 140  Currently,
cyberlaunderers using this approach are susceptible to detection when
they attempt to convert their electronic money into traditional cash. 14 1
However, there will come a time when the electronic cash will never
return to the traditional banking system as more goods and services
become available for purchase on the Internet.
142
V. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO CYBERLAUNDERING
With electronic cash developing, the government is anticipating
changes in money laundering. 14 Regulators are under pressure with
the current growth of cyberspace financial activities to come up with a
plan to combat cyberlaundering. 144 FinCEN believes that less than
onepercent of suspected computerized money laundering is prosecut-
ed. 145
To understand what laws are needed, the various interests at stake
should be examined. 146
A. Competing Interests
Electronic cash is still in the developmental stages. 147 Many elec-
tronic payment systems are being designed; only a few systems make
it beyond the field-test stage.' However, many corporations and
banks are planning to offer electronic products. 49 At the design
stage, these companies will make decisions about cost, security, and
anonymity 150 because there are no uniform standards for electronic
140. See Atkinson, supra note 110 (quoting Dr. James Backhouse of the London School
of Economics).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11. The government's anticipation of
new issues was the impetus for the simulated exercises described in supra note 2.
144. See id.
145. See Internet Aids Money Laundering Fraud Expert, supra note 113.
146. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 28. One way FinCEN is trying
to determine the various interests at stake and the impact of electronic cash on money laundering
is by holding conferences and simulated exercises. The authors attended simulated exercises
conducted by RAND in the spring of 1997. These simulations are described in Ann Davis,
Concerns Rise on Laundering Money On-Line, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1997, available in 1997
WL-WSJ 2413155.
147. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 454.
148. See id.
149. See Wines, supra note 24; Froomkin, supra note 28, at 454.
150. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 454.
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cash. 151 The attractiveness of these systems to money launderers will
depend on the features chosen.
152
Electronic cash providers will design their systems to maximize
customer acceptance and minimize fraud. 153 The government can
influence the designs of these systems. 154 The government's goal is
"[t]o try to nudge the industry in a direction that does not mandate any
new regulatory scheme."'155 For competitive reasons, banks want
electronic cash issuers to be placed under the same recordkeeping re-
quirements as banks.156
Privacy interests of consumers and merchants often will conflict with
the government's interest in obtaining information to prevent money
laundering. 157 If the government begins regulations too soon, it risks
stifling innovation and hurting U.S. businesses' ability to compete in a
global market. 158 For this reason, many experts believe it is too early
for the government to intervene. 159
151. See id,
152. See FATF REPORT, supra 14.
153. See id., app., at 9.
154. See id. Thomas Feegel of First Virtual Holdings, Inc., an on-line financial service
provider, stated that it was essential for government to be involved in the developmental stages
in order to send a message to would-be money launderers.
155. Ann Davis, Rules of the Game: On-Line Money-Laundering Sets the Regulators Abuzz,
WALL ST. J. (Europe), Mar. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJE 3808229..
156. See Internet Gives "Cash Tracking" Concerns to Task Force, TELECOMWORLDWiRE,
Mar. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10056245; Davis, supra note 155 (uniform regulations are
needed).
157. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 17-18; TOWARD
ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at vi (stating that law enforcement's interest in obtaining
information often conflicts with consumers' privacy interests).
158. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at vi. Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, believes that the private
sector should be allowed to solve any problems that develop in the electronic payment system
area. Greenspan stated that, "[i]f we wish to foster financial innovation, we must be careful not
to impose rules that inhibit it." Feds Hype Electronic Commerce at Meeting of Treasury
Heavies, supra note 136.
159. Dr. Alan Westin has stated that it is too early to legislate in the areas of smart cards
and Internet commerce. See Testimony of Dr. Alan F. Weston, Professor of Public Law and
Government, Columbia University, and publisher of Privacy & American Business, Before the
Subcomm. On Domestic and International Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. (June 11, 1996), available
in 1996 WL 316039 [hereinafter Westin Testimony]. According to Westin, Congress should
monitor the advances of new technology in the financial services field. See id. In addition to
Westin, Ira Magaziner, a top White House aide who heads a task force that is writing a proposed
policy paper on electronic commerce, and Christina Vamey, a Federal Trade Commissioner, have
urged the federal government to proceed with caution regarding Internet regulation. See Mitch
Wagner, Feds Lean Toward Minimal Electronic-Commerce Regulations, COMPuTERWORLD, Mar.
24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7733567. Magaziner spoke at the Seventh Conference on
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One of the government's main interests is in having an audit trail on
electronic cash that can be followed. The critical difference between
electronic cash and other payment systems (checks, credit and debit
cards, wire transfers, cash) is that the other systems leave an audit trail,
whereas electronic cash can be configured to leave an audit trail or not.
Currently, they are designed not to generate a trail. 16 0 David Chaum,
founder of DigiCash, Inc., stated that his corporation has received
multiple requests from people wanting to change their offshore bank
accounts to electronic money 161 because DigiCash does not leave an
audit trail. 162
B. The Audit Trail
The audit trail is the key.163 Reconstructing the transactions is es-
sential to any investigation and prosecution. Congress recognized this
and so mandated creation of a paper trail for cash through a series of
reporting requirements. Similarly, the reporting and record keeping164
requirements for wire transfers recognize the importance of recon-
structing the sequence of transactions. For electronic cash, systems can
be engineered to create a trail or not.165 Smart cards can allow the
tracking and recording of almost every payment a person makes and
Computers, Freedom and Privacy. See ia Likewise, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, stated that the smart-card industry should be self-
regulated, allowing government regulations to serve only as gap-fillers for the private sector. See
Feds Hype Electronic Commerce at Meeting of Treasury Heavies, supra note 136; Browning
supra note 32 (paraphrasing Greenspan as saying that the government should not interfere with
the development of electronic money). Greenspan went on to say that, "[c]onsumers and
merchants, not governments, will ultimately determine what new products are successful in the
market place.... Government action can retard progress, but almost certainly cannot ensure it."
Feds Hype Electronic Commerce at Meeting of Treasury Heavies, supra note 136. Similarly, Ian
J. Macfarlane, Chairman of the Reserve Bank of Australia, stated that we should view smart
cards as travelers' checks as opposed to currency. Therefore, regulating the cards would not be
appropriate for the Reserve Bank. See Browning, supra note 32.
160. See Atkinson, supra note 110.
161. See Davis, supra note 155. Chaum added that his company always declined such
requests. See id.
162. See id. DigiCash's system has one-way privacy in that "the system only records the
origin of money that comes in, not the path of money when it goes out." See id.
163. See Unaccountable for Their Actions, SMART CARD BULL., June 1, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 9677143 ("[t]he issue of whether or not smart cards should have an audit trail lies
at the heart of the electronic purse debate"). Former head of the FBI national computer crimes
squad, James Settle, stated that following the money trail resolves many crimes. See Wittes,
supra note 24.
164. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.33.
165. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 473.
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generate extensive audit trails. 166 The government should require the
issuers to design the electronic cash systems to create an audit trail,
even if is more expensive. 167
Besides an audit trail, two other suggestions minimize the benefits
of electronic cash to laundering. The first is low value limits. Technolo-
gy exists to allow unlimited value to be carried on a smart card.168
But the value carried on a smart card or on the Internet can also be
limited. So called micropayments, where Internet merchants receive
small amounts for their merchandise, are not a major concern 169
Laundering money with electronic cash will not be economically feasi-
ble for criminals if they are limited to small amounts. 170
The second approach to minimize laundering through electronic cash
is to limit the number of peer-to-peer transactions that can be done
before the electronic cash has to be encashed back through an interme-
diary company such as a financial institution or electronic cash issu-
er. 1 Peer-to-peer transactions make electronic money almost a cash
equivalent. Tracking it is more difficult if, once launched, electronic
cash never has to pass through any potential information chokepoint
again.
Some private sector electronic cash proponents argue that electronic
cash can actually reduce money laundering rather than increase it. 172
Their argument relies on the assumption that eventually electronic
money will replace traditional cash as the dominant form of pay-
ment.173 They argue that properly designed electronic cash, i.e., elec-
tronic cash systems that create a trail and are limited to low dollar
amounts, could be the solution to money laundering problems. 174
166. See TOWARD ELECTRONIc MONEY, supra note 11, at 19-21. Electronic cash can be
as fungible as traditional cash and not leave a paper trail depending upon its development. See
id. at 27; Froomkin, supra note 28, at 453 (electronic or digital cash can leave a detailed audit
trail or provide more anonymity than cash).
167. Suggestions for combating the money laundering potential of smart cards include
forcing issuers and developers to design the cards to leave an audit trail. See TOWARD ELEC-
TRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 28. Results from other countries show a low criminal interest
when smart cards leave audit trails. Id
168. See id.
169. One commentator downplayed the role of the Mondex card in money laundering
schemes, suggesting that Mondex cards probably were going to be limited to $500 per card. See
Froomkin, supra note 28, at 475.
170. See id. CyberCash has limited its micropayments to $10.
171. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, app., at 6.
172. See Browning, supra note 32.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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These suggestions limits on the value of smart cards and computer
accounts and limits on the number of peer-to-peer transfers before the
electronic cash must go through a chokepoint-are helpful, but they are
no substitute for an audit trail. Components of a working audit trail are
a trail that exists, a trail that is readable, and a trail that is followable.
1. Creating the Trail. Information Chokepoints
"Our primary focus has been on banks as the linchpin of
any effective anti-money-laundering strategy... If tech-
nology permits anonymous transactions outside the regulat-
ed banking sector, our efforts to make money-laundering
riskier and costlier may go out the door.'175
The government must be able to trace transfers of value to detect and
prosecute money laundering. 176 The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) is the
set of laws that makes cash traceable. The BSA requires financial
institutions, consumers, and businesses to provide data that enable law
enforcement to track money.177 The government relies on financial
institutions as information "chokepoints."17 8 Chokepoints are intervals
or portals through which funds must pass and be recorded. 179 The
BSA ensures that financial institutions maintain a paper trail on cash
that the government can follow. 180
Whether the BSA will apply to electronic cash depends on whether
the issuers and products meet the BSA's definitions a81 Regardless of
whether the BSA is modified to apply to electronic cash, though, elec-
tronic cash systems should be designed to create an audit trail. As noted
above, just changing the BSA to apply to electronic cash may not be
effective because electronic cash does not depend as heavily on entry
into the traditional financial system. The BSA was designed for cash,
and merely extending it to electronic cash is not a complete solution.
175. Davis, supra note 155 (quoting Stanley Morris).
176. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 4.
177. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 28.
178. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, app., at 4; see also TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY,
supra note 11, at 28 (law enforcement relies on financial institutions to provide crucial infor-
mation to help in the detection of money laundering); Exploring the World of Cyberpayments,
supra note 7, at 16 (law enforcement needs banks to provide data in order to fight money
laundering).
179. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 16; TOWARD ELECTRONIC
MONEY, supra note 11, at 28 (chokepoints are checkpoints through which cash must pass).
180. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 28.
181. See id.; FATF REPORT, supra note 14, app., at 4 (definitions will play a key role in
the regulation of electronic payment systems). Definitions are in 31 U.S.C. § 5312.
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If money laundering is not detected in the placement phase, then
electronic payment systems can make it almost impossible to catch
cyberlaunderers. 182 Currently, tracking even large wholesale transfers
of value by banks over wire networks is difficult. 183 Controlling laun-
dering becomes even more difficult when any consumer with access to
a computer or telephone can transfer funds instantly all over the
world.r
2. Reading the Trail: Cryptography
[E]ncryption ... is simply a code that can prevent people
from understanding what you're saying and what you're
communicating, but it is a terribly sophisticated technologi-
cal device. 185
Encryption is one of the most important aspects of electronic
cash. 186 Encryption protects consumer privacy and electronic com-
merce by preventing electronically stored value from being intercepted,
stolen, and counterfeited.1 87 But encryption likewise could help
laundering. 188 Some encryption devices are almost undecipherable
and could help facilitate criminal activities. 189 Cryptographic technol-
ogy allows an Internet user to send anonymous messages.190 Encryp-
tion software could make it almost impossible for the government to
trace financial transactions. 191 According to the American Bankers
182. This is due to the amount of layering and integrating that is possible with high-speed
computer applications. See INFORMATION TEICHNOLOGIES, supra note 24.
183. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 16. Wholesale electronic
transfers of funds among banks is an everyday practice around the world. See INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 24. However, these transfers are backed by some form of legal ten-
der. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 22.
184. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 16.
185. eno Address, supra note 1, at 576, 578.
186. See TOwARD ELECrRONIc MONEY, supra note 11, at 20; Exploring the World of
Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 11 (encryption prevents electronically stored value from being
stolen).
187. See Westin Testimony, supra note 159, at 470; Fxploring the World of Cyberpayments,
supra note 7, at 11.
188. See Westin, supra note 123, at 485; TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONY, supra note 11, at
30 (private sector's new innovative encryption technology could cause law enforcement some
problems).
189. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 30; Reno Address, supra note
1, at 579 (United States supports export controls over undecipherable cryptography for national
security reasons).
190. See Froonkin, supra note 28, at 414.
191. See Westin, supra note 123, at 486.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Association, "military-grade cryptography plus anonymous re-mailers
plus fully anonymous digital cash plus bad guys equals perfect
crimes. , 19
2
Encryption is a technical and complicated mathematical subject. 193
Encryption techniques are based on formulas that substitute a symbol for
the true letter, number, or symbol being communicated. 194 The
specific formula, called the "key," is used to code or encrypt a mes-
sage.195 If a person knows the key, he or she can unlock or decrypt
the code.196 Strong encryption techniques allow businesses and
consumers in the digital world to have confidence that the information
they are sending is secure. 197 The private sector is building stronger
and better encryption devices into their systems to ensure reliability and
authenticity.198 DigiCash's encryption is so powerful that it cannot
keep track of how its customers spend their money.199 Technology
like this creates problems for the government, which needs to be able
to decrypt these messages when criminal activity is suspected.200
Powerful home computers make banks susceptible to financial
crime.20 1 Thus, banks have been developing strong security systems
that will protect users on the Internet. 20 2 Strong security systems that
protect data also can make it harder to gather the information necessary
to detect money laundering.20 3
Encryption technology customarily has been developed by the mili-
tary.204 However, software developers now can write almost impene-
192. Wittes, supra note 24, at 1 (quoting Kawika Daguio of the American Bankers
Association).
193. See Exploring the World of Cyberpayments, supra note 7, at 11. In smart card systems,
the encryption lock is encoded and placed in the card's magnetic chip. See id
194. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 29-30.
195. See id at 30; Don't Tell It to the Spartans, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 9568266 (noting that a "key" is the rules that allow a person to encode or decode
the message).
196. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 30.
197. See id.
198. See id; Net Profits, supra note 8 (CommerceNet, a private company, will issue
Mosaic with "public-key cryptography").
199. See Davis, supra note 155. DigiCash's system has one-way privacy in that "the system
only records the origin of money that comes in, not the path of money when it goes out." Id.
200. See TOWARD ELECITRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 30.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Wittes, supra note 24. Strong cryptography could allow money laundering to
become even more profitable. See id.; Westin, supra note 123, at 470 (stating that innovations
in cryptography could hurt law enforcement).
204. See Benjamin Wittes, The Year in Cyberlaw: The Rapid Development of the Internet
Poses Intriguing New Legal Problems, as well as Possibilities, LEGAL TIMES 5 (1996).
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trable codes with relatively ease.205 The National Security Agency
has released for commercial use the Clipper Chip, which is an encryp-
tion standard that gives the government an electronic back door to
decrypt codes.206 With court authorization, law enforcement could
retrieve two escrowed codes that the government maintains in storage
and decrypt the signals.207 The government hopes to encourage
private companies to use Clipper chips by buying Clipper products for
government use. Thus, anyone wanting to do business with the
government must be using Clipper products. 20 8 Industry does not like
the Clipper plan because it removes private enterprise from the market
by establishing a uniform encryption standard.209
The government's ability to control money laundering may depend
on decisions made in the genesis of electronic payment systems. Setting
up a "key" system will allow the government access to the information
upon a showing of probable cause. Of course this approach would not
expand government power but would only preserve the status quo.210
Some cryptographic algorithms are almost impenetrable and are more
protected than currency.2 1 Janet Reno stated that "our goal must be
to encourage strong encryption for privacy in commerce [while] pre-
serving law enforcement's ability to protect public safety and national
security."212 Encoding the cash where only the government or a
205. See id.
206. See id. For a comprehensive examination of the issues surrounding the "Clipper Chip,"
see Anjali Singhal, The Piracy of Privacy? A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Key Escrow
Cryptography, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 189 (1996); Henry R. King, Note, Big Brother, The
Holding Company: A Review of Key-Escrow Encryption Technology, 21 RuTGERS COMPUTER
& TEcH. L.J. 224 (1995); Charlene L. Lu, Note, Seeking Privacy in Wireless Communications:
Balancing the Right of Individual Privacy with the Need for Effective Law Enforcement, 17
HASTINGS CoMm. & ENT. Li. 529 (1995); Mark I. Koffsky, Comment, Choppy Waters in the
Surveillance Data Stream: The Clipper Scheme and the Particularity Clause, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J.
131 (1994).
207. See Wittes, The Year in Cyberlaw, supra note 204.
208. See id.
209. See id. The Clinton Administration has started buying Clipper phones. See id.
210. See Reno Address, supra note 1, at 577.
211. David Chaum, who heads DigiCash, has made a series of mathematical algorithms and
formulas that use encryption technology to make financial transactions untraceable. DigiCash's
on-line payment system, "e-cash," is in the later stages of testing.
212. Reno Address, supra note 1, at 577. Reno also stated that,
Some suggest that the answer is simply better technology and more money for law
enforcement. They say if law enforcement is given the money, it can decode even
sophisticated 56-bit encryption. That's simply not true. Money aside, decoding a
56-bit key using current technology is so time consuming as to render the results
useless to law enforcement. We estimate that even with the top of the line super-
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trusted third party could read and understand it is one way to provide
privacy and meet law enforcement's needs. 213 The government's right
to use the information from this "clipperized cash" could have built-in
safeguards to prevent abuse.214 Janet Reno went on to state that,
A consensus is now emerging throughout much of the
world that the best way to achieve this balance is by
creating a system, otherwise known as Key Escrow, to
entrust the encryption keys with a neutral third party-these
keys, in effect, unlocking the code under certain circum-
stances. The government would then obtain the keys from
the escrow agent to decrypt the data but only as part of a
legally authorized and court-supervised investigation. We
are not looking to expand federal power or to increase our
authority to wiretap or to search. We look only to make
existing law apply to new technology.
215
Currently, a Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) has been pro-
posed.216 With the permission of the court, the KMI would allow cer-
tain federal officials access to the "keys" that would decrypt messages
that were encrypted by private sector technology.2 17 The debate
continues on this proposal . 2
Encrypted data must be accessible by the government,2 19 but it
should only be accessible on a showing of probable cause. This would
mean no change in the Fourth Amendment law beyond adjustments to
accommodate new technology.
3. Following the Trail: International Cooperation
The audit trail has to exist, it has to be readable, and ultimately it
has to be followable. Electronic cash flows easily over borders, so
following an audit trail on electronic cash demands international
cooperation. Global economic integration benefits criminals as well as
computer, decoding a 56-bit key would take over a year and the evidence would
be long gone. That's clearly too long.
Id. at 576-78.
213. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 503.
214. See id.
215. Reno Address, supra note 1, at 577.
216. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 30.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See Reno Address, supra note 1, at 576; Net Profits, supra note 8 (noting that the
federal government is discouraging encryption technology that cannot be tapped).
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legitimate business;220 money can be laundered without regard for
international borders.22 1  Governments have to cooperate; global
cooperation in fighting money laundering is essential. The Internet
allows anonymous international cash flows.223 The Internet and the
global marketplace could allow money launderers to transfer funds to
countries that have weak money laundering laws.224 FinCEN projects
that cyberspace activities will allow billions of dollars to be transferred
across national borders every year.22
5
One problem with international enforcement of money laundering
measures is determining jurisdictional authority.226  The current
regulatory system is based on established geographic and financial
220. See Noble Warns of Technological Progress as Boon to Laundering, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, June 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8353473.
221. See id.; TOWARI) ELECTRoNIc MONEY, supra note 11, at 34 (stating that many elec-
tronic payment systems operate beyond national boundaries).
222. See FINCEN YEAR END REVIEW (1994); E-Money Laundering Gets State Department
Attention, supra note 27. Money laundering through electronic payment systems by drug
traffickers and mafia organizations is one of the biggest problems that the Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) faces. INL is part of the United
States Department of State. See id. See also TOWARD ELECIRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at
34. For an interesting discussion of how cultural differences in Thailand, China, and Taiwan may
preclude effective anti-money laundering legislation, see Douglas Barnes, Money Laundering and
Bank Regulation (visited Apr. 3, 1997) <http://www.enfo.con/maillists/rre/0099.htmI>. Barnes,
who attended the Fourth International Conference on Money Laundering, Forfeiture, Asset
Recovery, Offshore Investments, the Pacific Rim and International Financial Crimes, stated that,
Chinese people (who are in the majority in Taiwan, and form an economically
active minority in Thailand) are very cash-oriented; I vividly remember payday in
Taiwan, with the boss sitting at a table piled with money, bundling up salaries for
everyone. I'd come home at the end of each month with a giant wad of cash from
my several different jobs. One could hardly imagine a better environment for
money laundering than a society in which large quantities of cash change hands on
a regular basis.
Id.
223. See Internet Aids Money Laundering Fraud Expert, supra note 113; Wittes, supra note
24 (stating that national borders are irrelevant on the Internet); E-Money Laundering Gets State
Department Attention, supra note 27 (finding that the movement of large amounts of drug-
tainted money across international borders via electronic payment systems is one of the biggest
problems facing law enforcement).
224. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, app., at 7. Money launderers have a tendency to
move their operations to countries that have weak anti-money laundering laws. See FINCEN
NEWS, U.S. Dept. Of Treasury, FATF REPORT HIGHLIGHTS MONEY LAUNDERING TRENDS, Feb.
6, 1997 [hereinafter FINCEN HIGHLIGHTS].
225. See Hughes, "Phantom" Cyberbanks, supra note 124.
226. FATF REPORT, supra note 14, at 16.
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boundaries. 227 Because international borders are less important with
modem technology, global cooperation and coordination is necessary to
fight money laundering.228 As long as one industrialized nation
chooses not to regulate anonymizing technology, the Internet will allow
everyone connected to have anonymous communications. 229
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is a twenty-six nation
organization formed to address the international problem of money
laundering.230  The primary purpose behind the 1996-97 FATF
Typologies meeting at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) was to start a dialogue between FATF members
and international designers of electronic payment systems. 231 in an
attempt to fully address the ramifications that those electronic payment
systems could have on international money laundering, the FATF invited
private-sector representatives and banking associations to its 1996 meet-
ing.2 3
2
As to privacy concerns, the European Union (EU) approach poses a
glitch for the United States. The (EU) has issued Directive 95/46/EC,
which establishes protections for individual privacy that are not
necessarily reciprocated by United States law.233 The EU's Data
Protection Directive states that if a company is outside of the EU and
wants to transfer personal data regarding an EU citizen outside of the
EU, then the company must satisfy one of the following requirements:
(1) the country that will be receiving the information must have
"adequate" privacy safeguards based on EU standards, or (2) the busi-
ness must show that its procedures meet the EU's standards by other
means.234 The Directive might prohibit EU member states from
227. See E-Money Laundering Gets State Department Attention, supra note 27; FATF RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 16 (stating that jurisdictional authority is based on national borders).
228. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, at 16; see also Greg.Steinmetz, Tax Cheats, Mafia
Still Drawn to Swiss Banks-Firms' Penchant for Secrecy Undercuts Tough Anticrime Effort,
WALL ST. J., July 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 3109339 (noting that the following
countries lead the way regarding mutual legal assistance requests: (1) Switzerland-189, (2)
Canada-138, (3) U.K.-136, (4) Germany-99, (5) Cayman Islands-83, (6) Mexico-79, and
(7) Bahamas-59).
229. See Froomkin, supra note 28, at 400.
230. See FINCEN HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 224.
231. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, app., at 1. This meeting was held in Paris, France.
On a related point, Janet Reno stated that, "While some countries still have weak laws, or no
laws, against computer crime, I am pleased to report that this is changing. U.S. law enforcement
agencies are quick to help with training and also unhesitatingly offer and solicit cooperation in
investigating international computer crimes." Reno Address, supra note 1, at 580.
232. See FATF REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
233. See TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 34.
234. See Westin Testimony, supra note 159; TOWARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11,
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sending computer processed information on individuals being investigat-
ed by the United States. 235 The EU will activate the Directive in
1998.236
Neither the Clinton Administration nor the Congress supports the
adoption of a privacy regulatory authority similar to the one in the
EU. 237 Likewise, the American public does not support a privacy
regulatory authority.238 However, without comprehensive privacy
policies, U.S. companies might have problems expanding the global-
ization of their services. They may have to deny the government
information from EU member states.
239
The resolution of this international glitch remains unclear. What is
clear is that countries have to work out a way to coordinate their money
laundering laws. 40
VI. CONCLUSION
Money laundering with electronic cash could become a major crime
if the government does not move carefully. It is probably too early to
legislate in this area, but the government should keep in mind the pos-
sibilities of limiting the value of electronic cash that can be put on smart
cards and Internet-based accounts and limiting the number of peer-to-
peer transactions. More importantly, the government should work to be
sure (1) that electronic cash systems are engineered to produce an audit
trail; (2) that the trail can be decrypted on a showing of probable cause
by use of the Clipper Chip; and (3) that the trail can be followed by
continuing efforts toward international cooperation. These approaches
will minimize, and perhaps extinguish, the advantages electronic cash
provides for money laundering.
at 34-35 (stating that the Directive declares that a member country should not transfer
information about an individual to a third country unless that country offers similar privacy
protections).
235. See TOWARD ELECrRONIC MONEY, supra note 11, at 35.
236. See Westin Testimony, supra note 159, at 471; see generally Spiros Simitis, From the
Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REv.
445 (1995) (discussing the EU Directive and its potential effects).
237. See Westin, supra note 159, at 485.
238. See icL
239. See id.
240. See Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 200 (1995); Money Laundering Via Smart Cards, supra note 115
(stating that governments are starting to understand the need for cooperation in order to combat
money laundering).
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